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Abstract 
Two crucial problems when research agencies or donors need to asses empirically the 
microfinance/children education nexus on already operating organizations are lack of 
availability of panel data and selection bias. We propose an original approach which tackles 
these problems by combining retrospective panel data, fixed effects and comparison 
between pre and post-treatment trends. The relative advantage of our approach vis-à-vis 
standard cross-sectional estimates (and even panels with just two observations repeated in 
time) is that it allows to analyse the progressive effects of microfinance on borrowers. 
With this respect our paper gives an answer to the widespread demand of impact 
methodologies required by regulators or by funding agencies which need to evaluate the 
current and past performance of existing institutions. We apply our approach to a sample 
of microfinance borrowers coming from two districts of Buenos Aires with different 
average income levels. By controlling for survivorship bias and heterogeneity in time 
invariant and time varying characteristics of respondents we find that years of credit 
history have a positive and significant effect on child schooling conditional to the 
borrower’s standard of living and distance from school. 
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1.  Introduction 
In a globally integrated world economy in which labor inputs and resources to finance physical 
capital investment  are abundant and extremely mobile across countries a crucial constraint which 
prevents  from  achieving  full  output  potential  is  lack  of  equal  opportunities.  For  equal 
opportunities  we  mean  the  situation  under  which  each  individual,  whatever  her/his  initial 
endowment of wealth, is allowed to develop her/his talent (and productive skills)  by having 
access to education and credit or, from another perspective, the situation under which individual 
economic achievements are independent from inherited starting conditions. Since in any economy 
there is partial mismatch between those having productive ideas and those having the financial 
resources needed to fund them, the role of credit is fundamental and that of modern microfinance 
even  more  so.  This  is  because  the  traditional  banking  system  has  serious  limits    in  financing 
uncollateralized borrowers and  therefore in allowing credit access to talented poor. The role of 
modern microfinance has been that of easing such access by replacing the role played by collateral 
on the borrowers’ incentives with other mechanisms such as group lending (Banerjee, Besley and 
Guinnane, 1994; Besley and Coate, 1995; Ghatak, 1999)  with joint liability, progressive individual 
loans and the threat of social sanctions (Wydick, 1999; Karlan, 2005a).  
More in detail, the literature has defined four main channels (income, smoothing, gender and child 
labour  demand)  through  which  microfinance  can  affect  child  education  (Maldonado  and 
Gonzalez-Vega, 2008). First, if microfinance borrowers use their loans for financing projects which 
yield returns above the lending rate their income increases and, under the assumption of parental 
altruism (Basu and Van, 1998),  the additional income may allow to overcome the threshold which 
triggers parents’ decision to send their children to school. Consider however that this mechanism 
has its fragility since, if the project returns are delayed in time, income may fall and not rise in the 
short  run  due  to  the  burden  of  loan  repayments.  Furthermore,  the  parental  agency  literature 
argues that parents may prefer to behave strategically not channelling the additional income on 
children education. In such case the impact of the income effect on child education will depend on 
the bargaining  process between parents and children  (Basu, 2002, Moehling, 2006). 
The second channel argues that if loans assist consumption smoothing (Pitt and Khandker, 1998; 
Khandker, 2005; Islam, 2007)  microfinance borrowers should not need to smooth consumption by 
withdrawing children from school (Kanbur and Squire, 2001). 
The third channel states that microfinance promotes children education  when, as in many cases, 
microfinance borrowers are mainly women since the latter have relatively stronger preferences for 
education  than  men  (Pitt  and  Khandker  1998;  Behrman  and  Rosenzweig  2002;  Thomas,  1990; 
Behrman and Rosenzweig, 2002; Sallee, 2001). Consider however that this channel works only   3	
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when the formal loan entitlement coincides with an effective shift of power toward women within 
the family.  
Finally, the fourth channel (child labor demand effect) identifies an unequivocally negative impact 
of  microfinance  on  children  education.  If  microfinance  leads  to  an  expansion  of  household 
productive  activity,  and  if  children  can  usefully  be  employed  in  it,  the  loan  may  increase  the 
opportunity cost of sending children to school. The same result can be obtained if the loan leads to 
an increase in hours worked by parents therefore making children more necessary to perform 
household chores. In both cases credit access may increase demand of child labor thereby reducing 
child schooling (Psacharopoulos, 1997; Jensen and Nielsen, 1997; Patrinos and Psacharopoulos, 
1997; Grootaert and Patrinos, 1999; Trigueros, 2002).1 
Given these conflicting effects in the relationship between microfinance and child labour, it is of 
foremost  importance  to  develop  sound  empirical  research  verifying  whether  microfinance 
performs  the  task  of  promoting  equal  opportunities  through  easier  access  to  education  for 
borrowers’ children.  
Surprisingly there are not many papers looking at the general issue of microfinance and children 
wellbeing and very few of them look explicitly at children education. This is probably not due to 
lack  of  interest  but  to  the  daunting  task  of  developing  a  convincing  impact  analysis  which 
overcomes methodological problems of selection bias, particularly severe in microfinance studies.2 
Among  the  existing  papers  negative  associations  between  child  labor  and  access  to  credit  are 
found by Dehejia and Gatti (2005) and  Jacoby and Skoufias (1997)3.  Yamauchi (2007) finds that 
investment  in  household  enterprise  does  not  necessarily  eliminate  child  labour  or  promote 
children‘s education in rural Indonesia, while Hazarika and Sarangi (2008) report that, in rural 































































1 Consider however that in many cases the increased demand for child labor may lead to forms of part time 
work and school, thereby not affecting directly schooling choices even though such option has been shown 
to affect negatively children schooling performance (Edmonds, 2007).  
2 In microfinance selection bias is embedded in the screening process of lenders who have to select most 
talented  borrowers  with  profitable  projects.  A  successful  screening  process  is  therefore  automatically 
expected to produce heterogeneity between accepted and excluded loan applicants.    
3 Dehejia and Gatti (2005) use cross-country panel data and find a negative association between financial 
development  and  child  labor.  Such  effect  is  showed  to  be  particularly  stronger  in  developing  countries 
because of higher income variability. The authors conclude that credit markets allow households and firms 
to smooth shocks in the economy. Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) examine how child school attendance reacts to 
seasonal fluctuations in the rural households’ income. Their conclusion is that unanticipated income shocks 
significantly  affect  children's  school  attendance  and  therefore  uninsured  households  withdraw  children 
from school in response to unanticipated income shocks, but not in response to anticipated shocks.    
4 Hazarika and Sarangi (2008) find that, in the season of higher labor demand, children’s propensity to work 
is  increasing  in  household  access  to  microcredit  (measured  as  self-assessed  credit  limits  at  microcredit 
organizations) in rural Malawi. Their school attendance is however not reduced, suggesting that increased   4	
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papers  the  nexus  is  shown  to  depend  on  various  factors  such  as  the  type  of  microfinance 
institution (hereon MFI) (Pitt and Khandker, 1998), the type of investment and borrower activity.5 
Our  paper  aims  to  provide  an  original  contribution  to  this  literature  by  testing  the  impact  of 
microfinance on child education with a novel methodology. The originality of our approach is in 
the creation of retrospective panel data and in the use of fixed effects and pre-formation trends in 
estimates where the length-of-access effect is estimated on a sample of microfinance borrowers.  In 
our opinion, the combination of these elements aims to solve two main problems common to many 
impact studies: i) selection bias when the researcher want to analyse the performance of an already 
existing organization and it is impossible to run randomized experiments. In this sense our paper 
gives an answer to the widespread demand of impact methodologies required by regulators or by 
funding  agencies  which  need  to  evaluate  the  performance  of e x i s t i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n s ;  i i )  d y n a m i c  
analysis when repeated observations in time  require too much time and costs to be collected and 
in many cases are not available because data collection was not planned ex ante. With respect to 
this point our approach allows to explore an otherwise fundamental and unobservable effect of the 
impact of our treatment (microfinance), that is, its progressive effect across years for the same 
individual.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the second section we describe the characteristics 
of  the  microfinance  institution  under  scrutiny.  In  the  third  section  we  explain  the  sampling 
procedure and in the fourth we illustrate the characteristics of our database, commenting some 
descriptive  findings.  In  the  fifth  section  we  explain  our  econometric  approach  and  robustness 





2.  The main features of the MF institution under scrutiny  
 “[...] The help we received from Protagonizar was enormous. I felt that not everything was 
lost. On some occasions we tried to get a bank loan but they asked for a credit card and 
wages receipt; impossible. Here instead, we go with our word, they believe and trust us. 
This is beautiful and I feel we are not alone [...]”. 6 
Protagonizar is a young and small microfinance organization with six years of life and more than 












































































































































































































child labour - mainly in the form of household chores - reduces leisure rather than schooling. 
5 Wydick (1999) finds that the relationship between child education and microfinance is not univocal and 
reports that the probability of child work is higher if the loan finances capital equipment and not working 
capital investment. Maldonaldo and Gonzalez-Vega (2008) find that households demand more child labour 
if they cultivate land and operate labour-intensive microenterprises. 
6 Extracted from the “microentrepreneurs’ stories” section of the Protagonizar handbook (2005).   5	
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second belt of Gran Buenos Aires (area of San Miguel) with small businesses (bakeries, textile 
enterprises,  beehives  or  basketworks)  of  poor  microentrepreneurs.  Protagonizar   p e r f o r m s  i t s  
activity with credit agencies located in the three “villas” (densely populated sub-urban areas) of 
Santa Brigida, Barrio Mitre and Villa de Mayo. 
The  organization  claims  that  its  competitive  advantages  are  the  low  operative  costs  (modest 
facilities, low installation and reduced functioning costs), the reduced distance from borrowers 
and the time dedicated in counselling and assisting them by the bank mixed staff composed by 
volunteers and paid professional staff members.  
An interesting feature of Protagonizar is that the organization moved in the opposite direction with 
respect  to  the  well  known  Grameen  case,  since  it    started  from  staggered  individual  credits a nd 
moved more recently to a group lending mechanism with full joint liability.  
The  old  staggered  individual  credit a p p r o a c h  c r e a t e d  a  g r o u p  o f  t h r e e  e n t r e p r e n e u r s  w i t h  
independent projects giving credit sequentially to each member conditional to the repayment of 
the previous borrower. The Protagonizar’s group lending approach hinges on the creation of a group 
of  4-6  individuals  to  which  money  is  given  simultaneously.  Group  members  have  full  joint 
liability. One of the group members, appointed group coordinator, is in charge of receiving the 
money  from  Protagonizar,  distributing  it  among  group  members  and  collecting  payments  on 
behalf of the lender. 
Eligibility criteria for group lenders are as follows. Borrowers are required i) to have at least six 
months of entrepreneurial experience, ii) not to be relative iii) to be located at no more than three 
blocks of distance from each other (a rule which aims to ease peer monitoring) and, iv) to have 
different business activities in order to diversify risk within the group. Among such activities  only 
one street vendor per group is allowed. The microfinance institution charges 5% monthly7 over the 
debt balance for both (staggered individual and group) loans. 8 Repayments take place on weekly 
basis. 
A specificity of the Protagonizar group lending approach is its three-sided screening process. The 































































7 Real interest rates seem high if we consider official, but less so if we consider unofficial inflation rates. 
Consider in  fact that Argentinean poverty lines are considered grossly undervalued due to a downward 
bias in computing domestic inflation.  One of the main independent research centers, Ecolatina,  estimates 
that  prices  rose  65  percent  from  Dec.  1,  2006,  to  July  31,  2009,  compared  with  the  20  percent  increase 
calculated by the statistical institute (to follow this debate  see:  
i) http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aKQUiLozzZko and ii) 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a5joiySC_mXc. 
8 The average lending rate charged by moneylenders in the three villas is around 50 percent monthly.   6	
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borrowers’ evaluation of  the payment capacity of the prospective client. The third check is the 
group lending mechanism. The latter is expected to induce assortative matching (Armendariz and 
Morduch,  2005)  since,  for  groupmate-neighbours,  trust  on  borrower’s  creditworthiness  has 
pecuniary consequences and is demonstrated by accepting to create a group with her under joint 
liability.  
During the screening process would be borrowers are visited by credit advisors to which they 
provide socio-demographic and business information by filling a standardized form. In a second 
step credit counsellors/advisors are asked to assess their credit capacity. The latter then formulate 
their proposal to the Credit Committee. If the lending decision is taken counsellors/advisors also 
perform monitoring activities with post-credit visits on weekly basis. 
Most  relevant  to  the  object  of  our  research,  Protagonizar  has  a  neutral  attitude  toward  child 
schooling. Its approach is targeted to support with financial resources borrower’s business and 
growth in economic opportunities while the goal of child schooling is neither in its operating 
activity  in  the  field  nor  in  its  declared  principles.  This  neutral  stance  reduces  the  potential 
confusion  between  schooling  effects  generated  by  the  need  to  comply  ex  ante  with  the  MFI’s 
standards and those caused by the ex post effect of the microfinance loan. 
 
 
3.  The research design 
Given the impossibility of running randomized control trials, we implement an ex-post impact 
evaluation based on quasi-experimental data. From June to September 2009 a questionnaire has 
been  delivered  to  360  micro-entrepreneurs  located  in  proximity  of  the  three  agencies  of 
Protagonizar (Santa Brigida, Barrio Mitre and Villa de Mayo) by two teams composed by one 
researcher and one field assistant each.9    
A  treatment  group  of  150  clients  (in  equal  proportion  from  Barrio  Mitre a n d  Santa  Brigida)  is 
formed randomly from a list of all MFI borrowers by keeping into account the heterogeneous 
seniority of the membership.10  
As  a  control  sample,  from  the  three  areas  of  interest  we  randomly  interview  150  eligible  non 
participants micro-entrepreneurs who were not borrowers (neither of Protagonizar nor of any other 































































9 The questionnaire is omitted for reasons of space but is available from the authors upon request. 
10 Borrowers' seniority is evaluated according to their credit-cycle.    7	
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In addition to the treatment and control groups, we also create a sample of 60 Protagonizar’s 
former borrowers who dropped out from the program.12 
By choosing members of the control group according to eligibility criteria we are able to reduce the 
potential heterogeneity between MFI and non-MFI types and thus the selection bias. Moreover, the 
inclusion  of  drop-outs  is  aimed  to  tackle  the  effects  of  the  survivorship  bias o n  o u r  e s t i m a t e s    
(Karlan and Alexander-Tedeschi, 2009). 
 
 
4.  Database and descriptive findings 
A  first  descriptive  element  which  gives  us  an  idea  of  the  local  standard  of  living  and  of  the 
distance of the respondents from the poverty line is the monthly mean and median household 
income in the whole sample which amounts to 4,096 and 3,000 pesos respectively. This implies that 
households  live  on  average  with  around  136,53  pesos  per  day.  Since  the  median  number  of 
members  in  the  household  is a r o u n d  4 ,  i n t e r v i e w e d  i n d i v i d u a l s  l i v e  o n  w i t h  r o u g h l y  3 4 . 1 3  
pesos/day, that is around 16.78 PPP US$/day using the country’s implied PPP factor computed by 
IMF in 2009.13 
Average schooling years of the respondent in the sample are quite low (8.4 years) and those of the 
partner  even  lower  (5.8  years)  (Table  1).  Average  total  productivity  (considering  main  and 
secondary jobs) is around 17 pesos per hour. 
Microfinance clients repay on average 108 pesos each month, that is, 27 percent of median income. 
In spite of it around 20 percent of income is saved. Finally, MF borrowers’ productivity is 21 pesos 
per hour worked against 16 pesos of eligible non-participants (again the difference in means is not 












































































































































































































11 Individuals who are not clients at the moment of the interview might instead have asked and received a 
loan in the last 20 years, the time span we consider for the retrospective panel. However, since Protagonizar 
is the first and the only organization providing micro-loans in the three villages, if (present) eligible non-
participants asked for a loan in the past they must have received it from formal banks or moneylenders (but 
not from other MFIs). Such an event would, however, not change the core of our analysis about the dynamic 
impact of microfinance (specifically, the micro-financial services provided by Protagonizar) on children’s 
education. 
12 We selected a number of dropouts from each area which is proportional to the historical exit rates of  
borrowers from the organization. 
 13 During the survey period (July-Sept. 2009), the average malnutrition and poverty thresholds were set by 
the INDEC (National Statistical Agency of Argentina) at 4.88 and 11.04 pesos/day respectively, which are in 
turn equivalent to 3.84 and 8.70 PPP –US$ according the PPP country’s factor evaluated by the World Bank 
in  2005.  When  considering  the  country’s  implied  PPP  factor  in  2009  (US$  2.033,  source:  IMF),  both  the 
malnutrition and poverty lines fall to 2.40 and 5.43 PPP-US$ per day respectively. However, if we correct 
these lines for the unofficial and more realistic inflation rates discussed in footnote 7, Protagonizar borrowers 
are much closer to poverty.    8	
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To go beyond overall sample averages we present descriptive statistics dividing the sample in 
three groups in Table 2 (clients, eligible non participants and  dropouts) and in three groups in 
Table 3 (respondents living in Barrio Mitre, S. Brigida and Villa de Mayo).14 
In  Table  2  we  observe  that  clients  have  higher  mean  household  income  than  eligible  non-
participants (4,982 against 3,662 pesos) which have in turn higher income than dropouts (2,958 
pesos). However, the difference between dropouts and clients is significant at 5 percent while that 
between  them  and  eligible  non-participants  is  not.  Ranking  and  significance  are  substantially 
unchanged if we consider median household income. Such findings document that individuals 
who drop-out are likely to belong to such a group due to some form of underperformance.  The 
same ranking can be observed when we look at productivity, 15 highest for clients (20.60 pesos per 
hour worked) and lowest for dropouts (13.18 pesos), with eligible non-participants in the middle 
(15.75 pesos).  The three groups are however substantially homogeneous in terms of demographic 
variables  (household  size,  respondent  education  and  age).  Finally,  clients  have  higher  job 
experience and save more even though the differences among groups are not significant in this 
case. 
In table 3 we observe that the geographical breakdown also matters. Individuals in Barrio Mitre 
are relatively poorer than those in S. Brigida ---average household income is respectively 3,677 and 
4,419 pesos. This implies that villagers from Barrio Mitre live on with 30.64 pesos/day (15.07 PPP-
US$) whereas those of S. Brigida with 36.85 pesos/day (18.11 PPP-US$)16.  
There is also a marked difference between the two areas in terms of productivity (20.08 pesos in S. 
Brigida and 15.45  pesos  in  Barrio  Mitre)  and  savings  (238.9  and  178.9  pesos  respectively).  We 
expect  that  such  differences  in  income,  savings  and  productivity  may  affect  the  impact  of 
microfinance  on  the  probability  of  schooling  of  respondents’  children.  Households  in  Villa  de 
Mayo seems to perform better than households in Mitre but slightly worse than those in S. Brigida 
in terms of income and productivity (45.35 and 35.51 pesos respectively); their monthly savings 































































14 We include a third village (Villa de Mayo) in which Protagonizar activity has just started and there are no 
treatment group observations (MFI borrowers). This is typically done in impact studies in order to reduce 
the noise generating potential spill-over effects from treatment to control group in the two other villages. 
The econometric results of the paper presented in section 5 are however robust in a check in which we 
exclude respondents of Villa de Mayo from the control sample. Results are omitted here for reasons of space 
and available upon request.  
15 Measured as the ratio between respondent and her partner’s monthly income (from all their activities) and 
the hours they spend in each activity. 
16 See footnote 7 and 13 for a discussion on poverty lines measurements in Argentina. 
17 A further breakdown of descriptive statistics by geographical location and interviewed status is provided 




5.1 Econometric specifications 
Two serious problems in impact analyses on development projects on existing organizations are 
the  impossibility  of  running  randomized  experiments  and  the  lack  of  time  series  data.  More 
commonly researchers dispose of a cross-section or of just two observations (before and after a 
given treatment) for each individual. A possibility to overcome these limits is the reconstruction of 
detailed time series from a cross-sectional survey with retrospective data. 
The  retrospective  reconstruction  of  time  series  is  based  on  past  information  required  from 
respondents  in  cross-sectional  surveys  and  commonly  adopted  in  the  literature  when  costs  of 
collecting  data  across  time  are  too  high  or  the  researchers  need  to  evaluate  an  economic 
phenomenon  for  which  this  information  is  not  available.  Among  various  examples  see  Peters 
(1988), McIntosh et al. (2010) and Becchetti and Castriota (2009)18.  
The  approach  is  reliable  when  past  information  demanded  does  not  require  unreasonable 
mnemonic effort and hinges on the identification of simple memorable events. As a matter of fact 
the three empirical contributions mentioned above ask respondents to identify years of events 
such as divorces and remarriages (Peters, 1988), house restructuring decisions (McIntosh et al., 
2010) and schooling years and age of children (as in our case). In discussing such methodology 
McIntosh et al. (2010) include among memorable events major diseases, deaths, school enrolments, 
and major asset purchases, while consider changes in profits and revenues among those which are 
more difficult to remember with precision.  
An important validating check for this approach is provided by Peters (1988) who compares the 
accuracy of retrospective information provided by respondents to a cross-sectional survey with 
panel data collected across time and  demonstrates that both sources of data give substantially the 
same results when estimating hazard rates of divorce and remarriage. Finally, consider as well that 
retrospective data present some advantages even with respect to standard panel data since they do 
not suffer from attrition bias problems. 
The use of retrospective data fits well the object of our inquiry. The information required from 































































18 Other examples of the use of retrospective data are provided by i) Garces at al. (2002), who use PSID data 
with the addition of retrospective questions on early childhood education in order to assess the impact of a 
public preschool program for disadvantaged children; ii) Smith (2009), who examines impacts of childhood 
health  on  socioeconomic  status  outcomes  observed  during  adulthood  relying  on  retrospective  self-
evaluations of the general state of one’s health and iii) Ilahi et al. (2000) who, using unique retrospective data 
from Brazil, explore the relationship between child labor, future adult earnings and poverty status.   10	
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number of children in the family, their age and the number of school years they have attended. We 
also  verify  whether  there  have  been  exits  and  reentries  in  the  schooling  record,  as  well  as 
repetitions. Based on the use of retrospective data we build time series of schooling decisions for 
each children in the respondent household in a 20-year time horizon.  
We  therefore  test  the  effect  of  years  of  credit  history  (affiliation)19 w i t h  t h e  M F I  o n  s c h o o l i n g  
decision using a logit fixed effect on the following specification: 20  
   
(1) 
where (Schoolijt) is a dummy taking value of one if the i-th children of the j-th family went to school 
in the year t and zero otherwise. Among socio-demographic variables we introduced those for 
which  theoretical  and  empirical  literature  on  child  schooling  has  extensively  demonstrated 
relevance and significance on child schooling decisions (see among others, Edmonds, 2007, Islam 
and Choe, 2009 and Maldonado and Gonzalez-Vega, 2008). NChildrenjt is the number of children in 
the family j at time t, JobExperience is the respondent’s job seniority (number of years worked in the 
current  (time  of  the  survey)  activity),  ParentageCohorts  are  the  respondents’  age  categories,21 
PreAffTrend is a (pre-affiliation) trend variable measuring the number of years for family j before 
becoming Protagonizar’s borrower, Childage is child’s age, DYears are time dummies (1989 is the 
omitted  benchmark),  AffilYears a r e  t h e  y e a r s  o f  a f f i l i a t i o n  ( y e a r s  o f  u n i n t e r r u p t e d  l e n d i n g  































































19 We define for simplicity years of affiliation as the time length of uninterrupted relationship with the 
lender (i.e. the time distance between the first loan received and the year of the survey for current borrowers 
with subsequent credit cycles). 
20 The approach is also known in the econometric literature as the conditional likelihood approach and allows to 
“difference out” individual effects in non-linear panels through a transformation that is the analogue of first 
differencing in the linear case. The basic idea is to consider the likelihood conditional on sufficient statistics 
for  the  individual  effects  (that  is,  the  individual  specific  mean  or,  equivalently,  the  individual  specific 
frequency in case of a logit link). Then, conditioning on the individual fixed effects, choices in the T-periods 
are independent. In this setting, a standard logit model is then obtained where the probability of the binary 
outcome  does  not  longer  depend  on  individual  effects  (which  have  been  differentiated  out)  and  where 
changes in the regressors between the T-periods allow to predict changes in the dependent variable. See 
Andersen  (1970)  and  Chamberlain  (1980)  for  a  more  detailed  description  of  the  technique.  The  main 
advantage of this approach is that neither distributional nor independence assumptions on the unobservable 
individual effects are required. However, this comes at the cost of having a sufficient number of units for 
which a change of state is observed; because of this requirement, only a small fraction of the sample might 
be used for the estimation. 
21 In order to avoid perfect multicollinearity which would arise from including year effects, respondent 
parent age and fixed effects we create dummies for any two year interval and dummies for parent age 
categories. We split the respondents’ age into five cohort dummies: 29-33, 34-38, 39-43, 44-48 and over 49 
years old. The omitted reference age category is 0-29.  
   11	
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In different specification of equation (1) (see Table 4) affiliation years are interacted with a village 
dummy (S.Brigida) and a distance dummy, Distant, equal to 1 if the child i  lives above the median 
distance  far  from  the  school.  We  use  such  interactions  in  order  to  catch  the  progressive 
microfinance effect on wealthier borrower (the ones living in S. Brigida) and on families with 
higher indirect costs of schooling (proxied by the distance from the school). 
With regard to child fixed effects   they incorporate (but do not allow to measure separately) 
important time invariant effects such as those of gender, parental education and district location. 
The specific impact of these variables will be evaluated with different estimating techniques in our 
robustness checks. 
Note that we do not have data on household income, a variable which is often impossible to track 
or  is  highly  imperfectly  measured  due  to  interview  bias.  As  a  consequence  many  papers  use 
proxies which are more easily measurable and less subject to bias such as parental education.22 In 
addition to it, we use here years of experience in the current job which is another important proxy 
under the reasonable assumption of learning by doing and tenure effects on income. 
Parental age is introduced here to measure something different from parental education (to which 
it is also correlated). Older parents may be less willing to send their children to school because 
they are linked to less schooling oriented traditions or because their age increases the need of 
being supported by children in their job activity.  
The inclusion of the pre-treatment trend variable allows us to evaluate the effect of affiliation years 
on  the  treatment  group  by  looking  at  the  trend  before  and  after  the  beginning  of  the  bank-
borrower relationship.  
When estimated on the overall sample, our specification therefore allows us to compare outcomes 
of the treatment group (borrowers) with the control group represented by eligible non-borrowers23 
by assuming that the two groups have homogeneous characteristics. We control for heterogeneity 
between the two groups determined by (children better than family) time invariant characteristics 
with child fixed effect, while we take into account time varying heterogeneity with comparison of 































































22 In a cross-sectional estimate we find that job experience and parental education account for a relevant part 
of the variability of current respondent’s income. The estimate is omitted for reasons of space and available 
upon request. 
23 Eligibility criteria in Protagonizar group lending require that borrowers i) have a minimum six month 
enterprise experience, ii) are not relative but iii) live at a maximum of three blocks of distance from each 
other (a rule which facilitates peer monitoring) and, in order to diversify risk within the group, iv) have 
different business activities (only one street vendor per group is allowed). We apply criteria i) and iii) to 




5.2 Econometric findings 
Table 4 presents results from fixed effect estimates. In the first and second column the model is 
estimated on the whole sample and on the subsample of microfinance borrowers plus dropouts in 
order  to  evaluate  the  microfinance  impact  after  controlling  for  survivorship  bias  (Karlan  and 
Alexander-Tedeschi, 2009). 
Such  estimate  also  allows  to  tackle  more  effectively  the  problem  of  heterogeneity  between 
treatment and control group and the related selection bias. As it is well known, even though we 
select  local  eligible  non-borrowers  in  order  to  enhance  homogeneity  between  treatment  and 
control group, it is not possible in principle to exclude self selection effects, that is, ex ante factors 
correlated both with individual productivity and the decision to become borrowers. This problem 
would widen the gap between the first best comparison with the counterfactual (what would have 
been the child schooling performance of the borrower’s offspring if he had not borrowed from the 
MFI) and our approach. The estimate excluding the control group eliminates such problem and 
isolates the dynamic effect of the borrower-bank relationship on our dependent variable.  
Consistently with what expected we find a significant negative relationship between parental age 
and child schooling, with a positive effect of parents below 43. Child age is negative as expected.24 
The  time  varying  regressor  measuring  parent’s  years  of  experience  in  the  job  they  are  still 
performing at the time of the survey is positive and significant. Since it is reasonable to assume 
that, due to learning on the job and work tenure effects, the variable is a proxy of the respondent 
income, such a finding probably captures part of the positive effect of the unobserved income 
variable on child schooling.   
Note that fixed effects incorporate the impact of all time invariant drivers of child schooling. As a 
consequence we cannot detect in this estimate the separate effect of child gender and parental 
education  (invariant  in  our  sample).  Another  proxy  of  income  (parent  education)  is  therefore 
incorporated in fixed effects. The unique counterintuitive result we have is that of the positive 
effect of the number of children on child schooling. Consider however that in fixed effect estimates 































































24 On the effect of children’s age on education attainments we expect that, the older the child, the more likely 
that she/he will show an education gap. Such a result is confirmed by Maldonado and Gonzalez-Vega (2008) 
and  Islam  and  Choe  (2009)  who  find  children  at  primary-school  age  to  have  a  higher  enrolment  rate 
compared to their older siblings, the latter being more likely to drop out from school and go to work.   13	
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The effect of affiliation years is not significant in this first estimate leading us to infer that the 
various  effects  (income,  risk  management,  gender  and  child  labour  demand)  compensate  each 
other. 
As discussed above, to understand more about what happens beyond the average overall sample 
effect we create two slope dummies interacting affiliation years with residence in the wealthier S. 
Brigida district and distance from school above the median distance in the sample. The rationale 
for the creation of this two variables is that: i) if the luxury axiom (Basu and Van, 1998)  holds (see 
introduction), with higher income the child schooling effect should prevail; 25 ii) families who are 
more distant from school pay higher (pecuniary or just opportunity) cost of transport, especially in 
areas  such  as  those  included  in  our  survey  where  problems  of  criminality  verified  by  our 
interviewers  are  very  serious  (and  children  must  presumably  be  accompanied  by  an  adult, 
especially if they are far from school).26  
In columns 3 and 4 (Table 4) we introduce only the district slope dummy and find that the effect of 
location on S. Brigida is positive and significant  both in the overall sample and in the estimates 
with borrowers and dropouts only. In columns 5 and 6 we introduce the distance dummy and find 
that its effect is positive and significant as well.  When in columns 7 and 8 we introduce both 
variables we find that both distance and district slope dummies are positive and significant when 
jointly considered. In order to evaluate more clearly the interaction effect of location in S. Brigida 
and  distance  from  school  we  estimate  an  additional  specification  in  which  a  dummy  for 
respondents with both characteristics is interacted with affiliation years and compared with the 
benchmark  affiliation  year  effect.  This s l o p e  d u m m y  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  and  strong  in  magnitude 
(columns 9 and 10). 
An important parallel result which reinforces our main findings is the lack of significance of the 
pre-treatment  trend  which  clearly  identifies  a  structural  break  in  the  schooling  performance 
around the beginning of the bank-borrower relationship. This result documents that the dynamic 
effect of the bank-borrower relationship does not depend on a spurious positive child schooling 































































25 A related interpretation is that current productivity and household income of borrowers may be a proxy of 
past values of the two variables. In this respect descriptive evidence at Table 3 shows a significant difference 
between borrowers in S. Brigida and Mitre in the year of the survey. The higher productivity and standard 
of living of the former may have generated enough savings to increase school attendance of the children in 
the household during the lending period.  
26 To quote just an example the local team supporting our researchers refused to accompany them in Mitre at 
late morning and afternoon for the danger of meeting criminals or drug addicts.   14	
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Since affiliation is non synchronous (it occurs at different time for each borrower) it is difficult to 
interpret a difference in pre-treatment (PreAffTrend) and post-treatment (AffilYears) trend effects on 
child education as due to other unmeasured concurring factors. One possibility is that the effect is 
not due to the treatment but to requirements that the organization poses on would be borrowers in 
terms of child education (i.e. a precondition for being financed by the MF is that borrowers send 
their children to school). However, as we documented in section 2, Protagonizar is neutral (does not 
take  any  position)  with  respect  to  the  child  schooling  issue.  Furthermore,  if  a  test  on  a 
dichotomous treatment effect may be subject to this observational equivalence, this is not the case 
of a gradual impact which grows with affiliation years. The precondition hypothesis would not 
explain  why  the  education  outcome  improves  across  years  even  after  the  beginning  of  the 
relationship with the MFI.  
Overall our findings document that the effect of microfinance on child schooling is positive and 
significant only conditionally to geographical location (in S. Brigida) and distance from school of 
borrowers.  Given  the  difference  in  standard  of  living  (and  current  sample  income  and 
productivity)27 between the two areas in which Protagonizar operates since more time, we can 
interpreted results by arguing that borrowers can be divided into four groups according to these 
two crucial variables (S. Brigida and Mitre residents close and far from school). Only one of these 
groups seems close to the luxury axiom threshold so to experience the stronger benefits from 
microfinance loans in terms of child schooling.   
Consider as well that affiliation results (when estimated in the overall sample) can be explained 
neither by heterogeneity in time invariant characteristics between treatment and control sample 
(captured by fixed effects) nor by heterogeneity in a time variant factor which ensured progress in 
child education even before the “affiliation period” (the lack of significance of the pre-affiliation 
trend). 
Finally,  our  child  schooling  results  can  be  hardly  related  to  a  pro-schooling  stance  of  the 
microfinance organization. As explained when describing the organization, its attitude toward this 
issue is absolutely neutral. Even if it were not, so the difference between pre and post treatment 
schooling trends documents that there are no traces of pre-formation attitude of future borrowers 
to  conform  to  a  child  schooling  prerequisite  by  the  organization.  The  gradual  positive  effects 
observed  only  for  a  subgroup  of  borrowers  also  confirm  that  there  is  not  a  uniform  effective 































































27 Given the types of activities of Protagonizar borrowers and the limited reach of their potential market we 
may  reasonably  assume  that  local  standard  of  living  is  the  crucial  variable  affecting  local  demand  and 
thereby driving income and productivity of most borrowers whose activities have mainly local customers.   15	
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5.3 Robustness checks 
Results from the previous section highlight a positive effect of affiliation years on the probability 
of child schooling for i) borrowers living in S. Brigida ii) borrowers more distant from schools iii) 
borrowers of S. Brigida located more distant from schools.  
A limit of our dependent variable may arise is that within variation (switches from 0 to 1 or vice 
versa) is limited. In our sample switches, that is changes in the dependent variable from t-1 to t, 
amount to 10 percent of total observations. The number is not so limited but however suggests us 
to perform further robustness checks. 
First,  we  propose  a  simple  logit  pooled  estimate  in  order  to  consider  a  larger  number  of 
observations  and  disentangle  the  effects  of  time  invariant  characteristics  (such  as  gender  and 
parent  education)  which  were  incorporated  in  fixed  effects  in  the  base  estimate.  The  baseline 
equation we consider is the following: 
         (2) 
Regressors in the pooled logit estimate are therefore the same as those in the fixed effect estimate 
with the addition of Male, a dummy taking value of one if the child is male and zero otherwise, 
RespEducation ( r e s p o n d e n t ’ s  s c h o o l i n g  y e a r s )  a n d  PartnerEducation  (schooling  years  of  the 
respondent’s  partner).  Parental  education  is  an  important  factor  which  is  expected  to  have  a 
positive and significant effect. This is due to the fact that the higher stock of human capital in the 
family not only generates higher income if “returns to schooling” work but also a more optimistic 
parental perspective on the benefit of education for their children (Maldonado and Gonzalez-Vega, 
2008) 
Problems of multicollinearity are greatly reduced with the omission of fixed effects so that we can 
replace parent age categories with parent age. Pooled logit estimates allow us to identify a positive 
education  and  gender  (male)  effect.  The  gender  effect  is  positive  and  consistent  with  what 
expected in the literature about  girl education to be less valued than the boys’ education so that 































































28 In this respect, Islam and Choe (2009) find that girls elder than 13 years (in the control group) tend to have 
a lower enrolment rate, whereas no differences between girls and boys in their educational achievements are 
found in Maldonado and Gonzalez-Vega (2008). In addition, as commented by Edmonds (2007), data from   16	
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The positive effects of the interaction of distance from school and S.Brigida location with years of 
MF-borrower relationship is confirmed in these estimates. Note however that, with pooled logit 
estimates, the baseline effect (AffilYears) - not significant in the base estimate - becomes negative, 
even though weakly so in the subsample of borrowers and dropouts. The comparison of this point 
with the fixed effect findings suggests the presence of some heterogeneity between borrowers and 
eligible non-borrowers with the first having time invariant characteristics which make them less 
prone to child schooling. An interpretation is that eligible non-borrowers are in healthier financial 
conditions or are in jobs with rosier perspectives (and this can motivate their non borrower status).  
The  pooled  logit  estimation  does  not  account  for  either  the  panel  structure  of  the  data  or 
unobservable c h i l d -specific  characteristics  that  might  be  correlated  with  the  outcome  variable 
(school attendance). Hence we re-estimate specifications 7-10 of table 4 with different approaches, 
namely i) logit child-random effects, ii) 3-level logit random effects iii) using Education Gap as 
dependent variable to address the scarcity of  switches in the School dummy. The following sub-
sections clarify each of the different robustness checks we use. Results are consistent with the 
previous ones, confirming the positive dynamic effect of microfinance on child-schooling only for 
the  sub-sample  of  villagers  from  the  richer  area  (S.  Brigida)  and  for  those  who  face  higher 
transport costs since located distant from the schools.   
a)  Child-Random effects 
We re-estimate the baseline model with random-effect logistic model for specification 7-10 (table 
4). Equation 1 then becomes: 
          (3)
 
where   are the child-specific unobserved random intercepts assumed to be normally distributed 
with zero-mean and variance   and  are the zero-mean and unit-variance normally distributed 
error  terms.  A  stronger  assumption  is  typically  needed  for  the  estimation  of  non-linear  panel 
random effects models, namely that   and 
 
are independent (not just mean independent). 












































































































































































































UNICEF's Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys  show that there is a sizeable increase in participation rates in 
market and domestic work for males at age 12, while girls experience discrete jumps at age 8, 10, and 12. The 
increase at age 8 for girls appears to be most dramatic in domestic work, whereas most of the increase at age 
10 and 12 for girls is in market work.   17	
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Results are reported in the first two columns of Tables 6 and 7. As in the previous pooled logit 
estimation, we find a positive impact of parental education but a negative effect of the length of 
MF-affiliation on the probability of child’s school attendance. However, the latter negative effect is 
counterbalanced by a positive and significant impact of MF-affiliation when borrowers live in S. 
Brigida (interaction AffilYears*Sbrigida) and when they are located far from the school (interaction 
AffilYears*Distant) as shown in Table 6, columns 1 and 2.  
When  we  consider  as  explanatory  variables  the  length  of  MF-affiliation  (AffilYears)  and  its 
interaction  with  the  borrowers  living  in  S.  Brigida  that  are  more  distant  from  the  school 
(AffilYears*Sbrigida*Distant),  only  the  latter  variable  shows  a  significant  and  strong  positive 
coefficient (Table 7, columns 1 and 2).  The findings are also robust to the sample split.29 
b)  Three-Level Random Effects 
In order to control for child and family unobservable heterogeneous characteristics, we re-estimate 
equation 3 using a three-level random logistic intercept model for which in t time occasions (first 














where   and   are respectively the child and family-specific unobserved random intercepts and 
are the idiosyncratic error terms. The same distributional and independence assumptions made 
in the random effect model previously commented extends also here, both on   and  . Such 
approach allows us to control separately for child and family heterogeneous and unobservable 
characteristics that might lead to biased estimates of MF-affiliation effect.    
Results are very similar to those we get from the previous model (chid-random effects) and are 

































































29 Consistently with previous results, we also find in this specification that the presence of younger parents 
positively affect the probability for a child to be at school whereas this probability declines when the child’s 
age increases.    18	
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c)  Education Gap 
To account for the scarcity of changes in the dummy dependent variable Schoolijt in the baseline 
fixed effect model, we construct an alternative child-varying schooling variable (Education Gap).  
Following  Maldonado  and  Gonzalez-Vega  (2008),  we  define  the  variable  Education  Gap  as  the 
difference in terms of years between the child’s highest level of education achieved and his/her 
expected  level  of  education  (according  to  the  age).  The  expected  level  of  education  (Expected 
Education) is then equal to ChildAge-6. 30 So we define: 
Education gap = max{0, Expected Education – Achieved Education} 
According to this measure, for example, a child who have attended the school up to the secondary 
school (without exiting in the past) shows an Education Gap equal to 0 at time t. In contrast, if 
he/she did not attended the school, Education Gap is exactly equal to Expected Education according 
to the age. If, instead, he/she had problems like late entry, repetitions, desertion, etc. the gap is a 
positive number. As it is evident from its definition the gap is also able to capture whether a child 
attended  the s c h o o l  c o n t i n u o u s l y  i n  t h e  p a s t  a n d  t h u s  t a k e s  i n t o  a c c o u n t  h i s / h e r  c u m u l a t e d  
performance. 
By  replacing  the  dependent  dummy  variable  Schoolijt w i t h  EducationGapijt w e  r e -estimate  the 
baseline child-fixed effects model (eq.1, columns 7-10 in table 4) with the following equation:  
       
(5)
 
Estimations are repeated also with pooled OLS. In both cases results are consistent with what we 
have found so far and robust to sample split.  
Specifically, MF-affiliation years per se make child’s education gap lager but the effect is reversed 
when considering either children living in S. Brigida (AffilYears*Sbrigida) or with children living 
more distant from the school (AffilYears*Distant) (table 6, col. 5-8). Again, only the children living 
in S. Brigida who live more distant from the school (AffilYears*Sbrigida*Distant) seem to benefit 
































































30  We consider in our panel only children aged 6 to 18.   19	
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6. Conclusions 
The  boom  of  microfinance  around  the  world  and  the  magic  aura c r e a t e d  a r o u n d  t h e  s a m e  
“microfinance”  concept  in  a  framework  of  asymmetric  information  and  lack  of  uniformly 
acknowledged standards, creates  a situation in which highly heterogeneous financial institutions 
have interest in using the concept in order to capture financial resources. This reduces the self 
explanatory power of the “microfinance” term and makes all the more urgent an evaluation with 
impact studies of different microfinance experiences around the world. 
One  of  the  most  debated  questions  in  this  empirical  literature  is  whether  microfinance  really 
promotes wellbeing of borrowers and of their families or traps them into a condition of financial 
dependence. A direction which may tell us whether there is an effective process of increase in 
wellbeing comes from the answer to the question on whether the bank-microfinance borrower 
relationship dynamically raises the likelihood of child schooling. 
In our paper we propose an original methodology to perform this type of impact study which may 
overcome important and common limits in these types of analysis (the impossibility of evaluating 
with a randomized experiment the impact of an already operating organization, the difficulty of 
collecting long time series on treatment and control samples). In this respect, the combination of a 
retrospective  panel  approach  with  tests  on  structural  break  between  pre  and  post-treatment 
trends, joined with techniques allowing us  to minimize selection and survivorship bias, provides a 
robust methodology to analyse the dynamics of the bank-borrower relationship on child schooling. 
The  additional  advantage  we  have  in  our  empirical  analysis  is  to  address  this  question  on 
individual data of borrowers from a microfinance organization which has an officially neutral 
stance toward child education.  
Our findings are mixed and show that the effect is robust and significant only in the district with 
relatively higher standard of living and for children living at  a relatively higher distance from 
school. Our conclusion is that, in the specific case, microfinance generates positive effects on child 
schooling only when parent income is above a certain threshold so that the Basu and Van (1998) 
luxury axiom applies and, specifically, for household in the higher standard of living and more 
productive area who live at a relatively higher distance from the school. The combination of these 
findings  suggests  that  microfinance  effect  depend  on  income  and  schooling  costs.  The  bank-
borrower  relationship  may  provide  additional  resources  which  compensate  transport  costs  for 
families which are more distant from schools but is ineffective (or even harmful) if the level of 
income remains nonetheless below the threshold of income under which parents are forced not to 
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Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  [95% Conf. Interval] 
Respondent’s Age  361  43.19114  0.6708767  41.87181    44.51047 
Household Income  361  4096.097  259.0923  3586.572    4605.622 
Household Food expenditure  361  38.85286  1.585422  35.735    41.97071 
Total Productivity  361  17.3678  1.189418  15.02872    19.70688 
Productivity from I activity (Respondent)  361  11.06951  0.9987779  9.105338    13.03368 
Productivity from II activity (Respondent)  361  2.226235  0.4532565  1.334872    3.117598 
Productivity from I activity (Partner)  361  4.04512  0.3502009  3.356423    4.733816 
Productivity from II activity (Partner)  361  0.0269314  0.0206987  -.0137742    .0676369 
Job Experience (years)  361  8.063712  0.4585132  7.162011    8.965413 
Savings/month  361  186.0295  27.65336  131.6471     240.412 
Distance from main road  361  1.285319  0.1369268  1.016042    1.554595 
N. of persons in the house  361  4.224377  0.1021779  4.023436    4.425317 
N.of children  361  2.99169  0.1123689  2.770708    3.212672 
Schooling years (Respondent)  361  8.430748  0.1636916  8.108836     8.75266 
Schooling years (Partner)  361  5.587258  0.2370289  5.121122    6.053393 
Credit cycle  361  6.614958  0.457248  5.715746    7.514171 
Total amount of last microcredit received  209  1086.158  44.76348  997.9096    1174.406 

































      Eligible non-participants     Clients     Drop-outs 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Err.  [95% Conf. Interval]  Obs  Mean  Std. Err.  [95% Conf. Interval]  Obs  Mean  Std. Err.  [95% Conf. Interval] 
Respondent’s Age  152  43.68421  1.104722  41.5015    45.86692  150  42.53333  0.9579838  40.64034    44.42632  59  43.59322  1.697304  40.1957    46.99074 
Household Income  152  3662.599  462.1428  2749.497      4575.7  150  4982.687  387.5127  4216.956    5748.417  59  2958.864  266.5228  2425.361    3492.368 
Household Food expenditure  152  42.29793  3.249835  35.87691    48.71895  150  35.89159  1.725943  32.4811    39.30207  59  37.50605  2.055087  33.39235    41.61976 
Total Productivity  152  15.79351  2.223757  11.39981    20.18721  150  20.60705  1.636741  17.37283    23.84127  59  13.1882  1.480573  10.22451    16.15189 
Productivity from I activity (Respondent)  152  10.34208  2.111818  6.169552    14.51461  150  12.75111  0.9573707  10.85933    14.64288  59  8.668322  1.318832  6.028393    11.30825 
Productivity from II activity (Respondent)  152  2.131734  0.5867983  .9723387     3.29113  150  2.92921  0.9037184  1.14345    4.714969  59  0.6824724  0.3089192  .0641034    1.300841 
Productivity from I activity (Partner)  152  3.319697  0.4336696  2.462853    4.176541  150  4.861917  0.6576364  3.562419    6.161415  59  3.837402  0.719836  2.396494    5.278311 
Productivity from II activity (Partner)  152           150  0.0648148  0.0497471  -.0334861    .1631158  59          
Job Experience (years)  152  7.447368  0.684113  6.095699    8.799038  147  9.390476  0.7362667  7.935359    10.84559  50  7.972  1.253365  5.45327    10.49073 
N. of temporary employees  152  0.0263158  0.0130265  .000578    .0520536  150  0.06  0.0254358  .0097385    .1102615  59          
Savings/month  152  78.48684  25.43209  28.23815    128.7355  150  313.8444  57.65782  199.9118    427.7771  59  138.1356  41.49351  55.07732    221.1939 
N. of persons in the house  150  4.013333  0.1608108  3.695569    4.331098  150  4.44  0.1529662  4.137737    4.742263  59  4.355932  0.2450715  3.865368    4.846496 
N.of children  152  2.519737  0.1600503  2.20351    2.835964  150  3.253333  0.169797  2.917812    3.588854  59  3.542373  0.3182745  2.905277    4.179469 
Schooling years (Respondent)  150  8.9  0.2614278  8.383415    9.416585  150  8.403333  0.2370445  7.93493    8.871736  59  7.59322  0.3753966  6.841782    8.344658 
Schooling years (Partner)  152  5.828947  0.3903659  5.057663    6.600232  150  5.28  0.3360675  4.615926    5.944074  59  5.745763  0.6056394  4.533444    6.958082 
Credit cycle            150  15.76  0.4911458  14.78949    16.73051          
Total amount of last microcredit 
received            150  1209.513  52.15598  1106.452    1312.574          






















  MITRE  S. BRIGIDA  VILLA DE MAYO 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  [95% Conf. Interval]  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  [95% Conf. Interval]  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  [95% Conf. Interval] 
Respondent’s Age  147  43.83673  12.53436  41.79356    45.87991  165  41.97576  12.57269  40.04312     43.9084  49  45.34694  13.76673  41.39267    49.30121 
Household Income  147  3750.075  2479.137  3345.96     4154.19  165  4666.333  6627.107  3647.632    5685.034  49  3213.98  3274.602  2273.404    4154.555 
Household Food expenditure  147  37.36071  21.43412  33.86681     40.8546  165  41.17489  38.61064  35.23977    47.11002  49  35.5102  16.66738  30.72277    40.29763 
Total Productivity  147  15.45767  12.56126  13.4101    17.50523  165  20.08081  30.12544  15.45001    24.71161  49  13.96254  14.18911  9.886948    18.03812 
Productivity from I activity (Respondent)  147  10.06212  9.299722  8.546205    11.57803  165  12.8035  26.12121  8.788217    16.81878  49  8.252741  9.221309  5.604072    10.90141 
Productivity from II activity (Respondent)  147  1.91264  6.073638  .922599    2.902681  165  2.512452  10.75937  .8585502    4.166353  49  2.203231  6.922279  .2149207    4.191542 
Productivity from I activity (Partner)  147  3.482909  5.809828  2.535871    4.429948  165  4.705933  7.757082  3.513536    5.898331  49  3.506563  4.585527  2.189446    4.823681 
Productivity from II activity (Partner)  147           165  0.0589226  0.5810446  -.0303941    .1482392  49          
Job Experience (years)  147  8.655782  8.446261  7.278989    10.03258  165  7.696364  9.041152  6.306582    9.086145  49  7.52449  8.431971  5.102545    9.946435 
Savings/month  147  178.9116  407.493  112.4877    245.3355  165  238.9495  667.5099  136.3417    341.5573  49  29.18367  90.11189  3.300516    55.06683 
N. of persons in the house  147  4.340136  1.981063  4.01721    4.663062  165  4.218182  1.834868  3.936131    4.500233  49  3.897959  2.162607  3.276786    4.519133 
N.of children  147  3.244898  2.069319  2.907586     3.58221  165  2.951515  2.188679  2.615077    3.287953  49  2.367347  2.048311  1.779003    2.955691 
Schooling years (Respondent)  147  8.183673  3.194645  7.662926    8.704421  165  8.433333  2.811417  8.00117    8.865497  49  9.163265  3.710048  8.097615    10.22892 
Schooling years (Partner)  147  5.306122  4.344123  4.598003    6.014242  165  5.569697  4.447833  4.885988    6.253406  49  6.489796  5.103604  5.02387    7.955722 
Credit cycle  147  9.088435  9.529281  7.535103    10.64177  165  6.375758  8.137801  5.124837    7.626678  49          
Total amount of last microcredit received  106  1226.038  678.1511  1095.434    1356.642  103  942.2039  582.5151  828.3574     1056.05  0        





































   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Dep. Var: School  Whole Sample  Clients&Drops  Whole Sample  Clients&Drops  Whole Sample  Clients&Drops  Whole Sample  Clients&Drops  Whole Sample  Clients&Drops 
                              
Parentage 29-33  3.463***  3.329***  3.251***  3.123***  2.993***  3.014***  2.705***  2.759***  2.806***  2.671*** 
  (0.965)  (0.977)  (0.963)  (0.975)  (0.978)  (0.992)  (0.984)  (0.999)  (0.998)  (1.009) 
Parentage 34-38  3.974***  3.660***  3.737***  3.403***  3.646***  3.473***  3.281***  3.104**  3.232**  2.812** 
  (1.210)  (1.314)  (1.216)  (1.320)  (1.219)  (1.325)  (1.240)  (1.351)  (1.258)  (1.372) 
Parentage 39-43  4.055***  3.645**  3.780***  3.354**  3.598**  3.304**  3.196**  2.914*  3.328**  2.832* 
  (1.431)  (1.533)  (1.443)  (1.546)  (1.452)  (1.558)  (1.477)  (1.587)  (1.480)  (1.590) 
Parentage 44-48  2.254  1.825  2.128  1.641  1.408  1.182  1.213  0.952  1.711  1.146 
  (1.907)  (1.993)  (1.893)  (1.988)  (2.024)  (2.098)  (1.997)  (2.086)  (1.916)  (2.021) 
Parentage >48  -11.40  -12.69  -11.64  -12.85  -11.96  -12.83  -12.66  -13.24  -12.46  -13.49 
  (809.4)  (1175)  (836.7)  (1117)  (718.3)  (957.0)  (839.5)  (918.1)  (894.0)  (965.4) 
Childage  -4.141***  -3.917***  -4.203***  -4.016***  -4.076***  -3.896***  -4.152***  -3.996***  -4.147***  -3.968*** 
  (0.421)  (0.450)  (0.429)  (0.463)  (0.411)  (0.444)  (0.422)  (0.458)  (0.428)  (0.461) 
PreAfftTend  -0.473  0.0236  -0.485  0.00924  -0.722**  -0.0967  -0.748**  -0.126  -0.519*  -0.0128 
  (0.311)  (0.188)  (0.309)  (0.195)  (0.344)  (0.261)  (0.346)  (0.281)  (0.311)  (0.205) 
JobExperience  1.355***  1.669***  1.361***  1.668***  1.094**  1.502***  1.094**  1.491***  1.312***  1.623*** 
  (0.408)  (0.395)  (0.408)  (0.400)  (0.429)  (0.429)  (0.433)  (0.440)  (0.412)  (0.405) 
NChildren  1.895***  1.569***  2.016***  1.691***  1.958***  1.555***  2.086***  1.694***  2.070***  1.745*** 
  (0.454)  (0.504)  (0.465)  (0.521)  (0.458)  (0.512)  (0.469)  (0.527)  (0.472)  (0.533) 
AffilYears  0.537  0.147  0.256  -0.0400  -0.358  -0.385  -0.454  -0.476  0.154  -0.106 
  (0.331)  (0.275)  (0.368)  (0.290)  (0.354)  (0.304)  (0.336)  (0.297)  (0.357)  (0.280) 
AffilYears*Sbrigida      0.882**  0.815**      0.769**  0.740*     
      (0.424)  (0.406)      (0.387)  (0.385)     
AffilYears*Distant          1.485***  1.024**  1.415***  0.991**     
          (0.479)  (0.417)  (0.471)  (0.417)     
AffilYears*Sbrigida*Distant                  1.517***  1.447*** 
                  (0.428)  (0.406) 
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  5158  3600  5158  3600  5158  3600  5158  3600  5158  3600 
Number of child fixed effects  509  348  509  348  509  348  509  348  509  348 
AIC  357.8983  307.8569  355.7026  306.0516  349.6724    303.3348  347.9264  301.8585  348.1513  298.572 
BIC  482.3161  425.4419  486.6687  429.8254  480.6384   427.1086  485.4408  431.8209  479.1174  422.3457 
Log-likelihood  -159.9  -134.9  -157.9  -133.0  -154.8  -131.7  -153.0  -129.9  -154.1  -129.3 

























   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Dep. Var.: School  whole sample  clients&drops  whole sample  clients&drops  whole sample  clients&drops  whole sample  clients&drops  whole sample  clients&drops 
                                
Parentage  -0.0267**  -0.0395***  -0.0271**  -0.0402***  -0.0265**  -0.0395***  -0.0270**  -0.0405***  -0.0270**  -0.0400*** 
  (0.0121)  (0.0148)  (0.0121)  (0.0148)  (0.0121)  (0.0148)  (0.0121)  (0.0149)  (0.0121)  (0.0148) 
Childage  -0.525***  -0.525***  -0.526***  -0.527***  -0.525***  -0.525***  -0.526***  -0.527***  -0.526***  -0.527*** 
  (0.0297)  (0.0374)  (0.0297)  (0.0375)  (0.0298)  (0.0375)  (0.0298)  (0.0376)  (0.0297)  (0.0374) 
Male  0.366***  0.278  0.365**  0.279  0.379***  0.294*  0.379***  0.294*  0.370***  0.287* 
  (0.142)  (0.173)  (0.142)  (0.174)  (0.142)  (0.173)  (0.142)  (0.174)  (0.142)  (0.173) 
RespEducation  0.151***  0.158***  0.150***  0.157***  0.156***  0.163***  0.156***  0.162***  0.150***  0.156*** 
  (0.0373)  (0.0466)  (0.0373)  (0.0466)  (0.0379)  (0.0475)  (0.0379)  (0.0475)  (0.0373)  (0.0466) 
PartnerEducation  0.0552***  0.0563**  0.0540***  0.0537**  0.0543***  0.0561**  0.0529***  0.0533**  0.0532***  0.0528** 
  (0.0184)  (0.0230)  (0.0184)  (0.0230)  (0.0184)  (0.0230)  (0.0185)  (0.0230)  (0.0185)  (0.0230) 
PreAfftTend  -0.0471**  -0.0175  -0.0479**  -0.0182  -0.0469**  -0.0173  -0.0476**  -0.0179  -0.0482**  -0.0185 
  (0.0219)  (0.0242)  (0.0219)  (0.0242)  (0.0218)  (0.0241)  (0.0218)  (0.0241)  (0.0219)  (0.0241) 
JobExperience  0.0362***  0.0283**  0.0370***  0.0294**  0.0359***  0.0281**  0.0367***  0.0292**  0.0373***  0.0298** 
  (0.0105)  (0.0121)  (0.0106)  (0.0122)  (0.0105)  (0.0121)  (0.0106)  (0.0122)  (0.0106)  (0.0122) 
NChildren  -0.0826***  -0.0496  -0.0801**  -0.0448  -0.0826***  -0.0503  -0.0798**  -0.0454  -0.0780**  -0.0422 
  (0.0319)  (0.0385)  (0.0320)  (0.0388)  (0.0319)  (0.0385)  (0.0320)  (0.0387)  (0.0321)  (0.0389) 
AffilYears  -0.0170  0.0321  -0.0480  0.00119  -0.193**  -0.135  -0.241***  -0.179*  -0.0504  -0.00105 
  (0.0489)  (0.0555)  (0.0531)  (0.0582)  (0.0856)  (0.0920)  (0.0876)  (0.0927)  (0.0522)  (0.0581) 
AffilYears*Sbrigida      0.157*  0.190**      0.181**  0.207**     
      (0.0937)  (0.0945)      (0.0917)  (0.0934)     
AffilYears*Distant          0.229**  0.207**  0.245***  0.220**     
          (0.0905)  (0.0921)  (0.0896)  (0.0910)     
AffilYears*Sbrigida*Distant                  0.242**  0.260** 
                  (0.103)  (0.105) 
Year Dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  7437  4956  7437  4956  7437  4956  7437  4956  7437  4956 
AIC  4623.855  3201.536  4619.987  3195.302  4611.723  3192.431  4606.229  3185.046  4616.327  3192.895 
BIC  4755.226  3325.195  4758.271  3325.469  4750.007  3322.598  4751.428  3321.721  4754.611  3323.062 
Log-likelihood  -2293  -1582  -2290  -1578  -2286  -1576  -2282  -1572  -2288  -1576 















Model:  a) RANDOM EFFECTS  b) MULTILEVEL  c) FIXED EFFECTS  d) POOLED OLS 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 






















                      
Parentage 29-33  1.803**  1.943**  1.803**  1.925**  -1.005***  -1.063***  -0.705***  -0.766*** 
  (0.749)  (0.807)  (0.734)  (0.791)  (0.148)  (0.187)  (0.0993)  (0.121) 
Parentage 34-38  1.229  1.604*  1.205  1.503*  -1.156***  -1.378***  -0.723***  -0.866*** 
  (0.829)  (0.908)  (0.821)  (0.899)  (0.241)  (0.298)  (0.121)  (0.152) 
Parentage 39-43  1.149  1.335  1.111  1.223  -0.875***  -0.997**  -0.567***  -0.658*** 
  (0.873)  (0.960)  (0.871)  (0.961)  (0.313)  (0.393)  (0.131)  (0.170) 
Parentage 44-48  0.220  0.203  0.313  0.134  -0.435  -0.578  -0.405***  -0.501** 
  (0.909)  (1.005)  (0.924)  (1.030)  (0.400)  (0.497)  (0.157)  (0.211) 
Parentage >48  0.143  0.0317  0.452  0.0707  -0.134  -0.153  -0.428**  -0.336 
  (0.974)  (1.087)  (1.009)  (1.136)  (0.502)  (0.619)  (0.203)  (0.246) 
Male  0.779*  0.596  0.515  0.530      -0.205**  -0.134 
  (0.414)  (0.484)  (0.365)  (0.429)      (0.0818)  (0.101) 
RespEducation  0.447***  0.418***  0.386***  0.357***      -0.0792***  -0.0920*** 
  (0.0837)  (0.0967)  (0.114)  (0.134)      (0.0171)  (0.0223) 
PartnerEducation  0.124**  0.0761  0.0995  0.0179      -0.0296***  -0.0321** 
  (0.0527)  (0.0633)  (0.0725)  (0.0889)      (0.0108)  (0.0133) 
Childage  -1.571***  -1.543***  -1.565***  -1.527***  0.979***  1.012***  0.846***  0.873*** 
  (0.0925)  (0.102)  (0.0938)  (0.103)  (0.0521)  (0.0629)  (0.0131)  (0.0161) 
PreAfftTend  -0.0669  -0.00230  -0.0363  0.0132  -0.0280  0.0318  0.0222  0.00790 
  (0.0640)  (0.0636)  (0.0674)  (0.0659)  (0.0396)  (0.0388)  (0.0164)  (0.0177) 
JobExperience  0.0589*  0.0487  0.0252  0.0347  -0.0650  -0.00152  -0.0218***  -0.0152* 
  (0.0303)  (0.0333)  (0.0396)  (0.0430)  (0.0425)  (0.0496)  (0.00795)  (0.00890) 
NChildren  -0.193**  -0.0715  -0.149  -0.0178  -0.115  -0.179  0.0540***  0.0374 
  (0.0932)  (0.112)  (0.140)  (0.164)  (0.109)  (0.129)  (0.0204)  (0.0254) 
AffilYears  -0.625***  -0.621***  -0.636***  -0.678***  0.312***  0.191*  0.184***  0.124* 
  (0.190)  (0.194)  (0.199)  (0.201)  (0.0923)  (0.0982)  (0.0684)  (0.0731) 
AffilYears*Sbrigida  0.496**  0.502**  0.507**  0.506**  -0.310***  -0.339***  -0.209**  -0.241*** 
  (0.225)  (0.218)  (0.246)  (0.236)  (0.111)  (0.110)  (0.0836)  (0.0844) 
AffilYears*Distant  0.618***  0.596***  0.573***  0.564***  -0.252**  -0.229**  -0.214***  -0.189*** 
   (0.208)  (0.202)  (0.222)  (0.213)  (0.101)  (0.100)  (0.0721)  (0.0731) 
                 
Year-Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
                 
Constant  20.85***  19.21***  21.05***  19.44***  -6.064***  -6.166***  -5.196***  -5.193*** 
  (1.541)  (1.671)  (1.719)  (1.903)  (0.434)  (0.536)  (0.237)  (0.295) 
RE 1: child (std.dev.)  3.276***  3.170***  3.736***  3.596***         
  (0.131)  (0.151)  (0.373)  (0.324)         
RE 2: family (std.dev.)      3.734***  3.402***         
      (0.291)  (0.405)         
number of level 1 units  7437  4956  7437  4956  7437  4956  7437  4956 
number of level 2 units (child)  861  562  861  562  861  562  861  562 
number of level 3 units 
(family)      295  176         
R-squared              0.578  0.602  0.613  0.629 

















Model:  a) RANDOM EFFECTS  b) MULTILEVEL  c) FIXED EFFECTS  d) POOLED OLS 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
























                      
Parentage 29-33  1.794**  1.928**  1.823**  1.949**  -0.999***  -1.056***  -0.700***  -0.758*** 
  (0.751)  (0.812)  (0.740)  (0.803)  (0.148)  (0.187)  (0.0992)  (0.121) 
Parentage 34-38  1.185  1.535*  1.198  1.483  -1.143***  -1.360***  -0.714***  -0.850*** 
  (0.832)  (0.913)  (0.823)  (0.908)  (0.241)  (0.297)  (0.120)  (0.151) 
Parentage 39-43  1.137  1.311  1.161  1.239  -0.872***  -0.994**  -0.565***  -0.656*** 
  (0.876)  (0.966)  (0.873)  (0.971)  (0.312)  (0.392)  (0.130)  (0.168) 
Parentage 44-48  0.223  0.195  0.371  0.135  -0.432  -0.570  -0.402**  -0.491** 
  (0.912)  (1.011)  (0.925)  (1.038)  (0.399)  (0.496)  (0.156)  (0.210) 
Parentage >48  0.111  -0.0203  0.519  0.0676  -0.146  -0.171  -0.426**  -0.342 
  (0.977)  (1.093)  (1.010)  (1.145)  (0.501)  (0.617)  (0.202)  (0.244) 
Male  0.758*  0.570  0.492  0.494      -0.202**  -0.132 
  (0.416)  (0.488)  (0.364)  (0.430)      (0.0819)  (0.102) 
RespEducation  0.431***  0.395***  0.402***  0.356***      -0.0767***  -0.0884*** 
  (0.0839)  (0.0972)  (0.117)  (0.136)      (0.0171)  (0.0223) 
PartnerEducation  0.121**  0.0694  0.103  0.0129      -0.0296***  -0.0319** 
  (0.0530)  (0.0638)  (0.0736)  (0.0905)      (0.0108)  (0.0133) 
Childage  -1.581***  -1.558***  -1.574***  -1.556***  0.980***  1.013***  0.847***  0.874*** 
  (0.0938)  (0.104)  (0.104)  (0.115)  (0.0521)  (0.0629)  (0.0131)  (0.0161) 
PreAfftTend  -0.0705  -0.00587  -0.0358  0.0140  -0.0305  0.0289  0.0229  0.00832 
  (0.0644)  (0.0642)  (0.0665)  (0.0659)  (0.0395)  (0.0388)  (0.0164)  (0.0177) 
JobExperience  0.0642**  0.0551  0.0287  0.0408  -0.0678  -0.00584  -0.0224***  -0.0157* 
  (0.0305)  (0.0336)  (0.0399)  (0.0439)  (0.0425)  (0.0498)  (0.00795)  (0.00892) 
NChildren  -0.182*  -0.0521  -0.139  0.00566  -0.120  -0.182  0.0521**  0.0342 
  (0.0939)  (0.113)  (0.140)  (0.165)  (0.108)  (0.127)  (0.0205)  (0.0256) 
AffilYears  -0.218*  -0.223*  -0.296**  -0.353**  0.134*  0.0208  0.0163  -0.0316 
  (0.123)  (0.132)  (0.140)  (0.149)  (0.0702)  (0.0770)  (0.0434)  (0.0479) 
AffilYears*Sbrigida*Distant  0.767***  0.775***  0.762**  0.789***  -0.423***  -0.425***  -0.286***  -0.308*** 
  (0.268)  (0.263)  (0.301)  (0.291)  (0.121)  (0.119)  (0.0978)  (0.0978) 
                 
Year-Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
                 
Constant  21.10***  19.56***  20.76***  19.57***  -6.053***  -6.158***  -5.224***  -5.231*** 
  (1.563)  (1.705)  (1.776)  (1.995)  (0.431)  (0.531)  (0.237)  (0.294) 
RE 1: child (std.dev.)  3.293***  3.195***  3.638***  3.638***         
  (0.133)  (0.153)  (0.332)  (0.371)         
RE 2: family (std.dev.)      3.807***  3.518***         
      (0.394)  (0.431)         
number of level 1 units  7437  4956  7437  4956  7437  4956  7437  4956 
number of level 2 units 
(child)  861  562  861  562  861  562  861  562 
number of level 3 units 
(family)      295  176         
R-squared              0.613  0.629  0.578  0.601 









Table A1. Summary statistics of Socio-Demographic and Economic Variables by Geographic Area (ONLY CLIENTS) 
  MITRE  S. BRIGIDA 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  [95% Conf. Interval]  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  [95% Conf. Interval] 
Respondent’s Age  76  44.32895  1.365539  41.60865    47.04924  74  40.68919  1.318134  38.06215    43.31623 
Household Income  76  4419.224  300.5372  3820.523    5017.924  74  5561.378  718.9793  4128.455    6994.302 
Household Food expenditure  76  36.78415  2.850863  31.10494    42.46336  74  34.9749  1.930336  31.12775    38.82206 
Total Productivity  76  16.60968  1.355221  13.90994    19.30942  74  24.71246  2.947885  18.83733    30.58758 
Productivity from I activity (Respondent)  76  11.07676  0.9560213  9.172272    12.98126  74  14.4707  1.657645  11.16702    17.77438 
Productivity from II activity (Respondent)  76  1.770285  0.5189164  .7365506     2.80402  74  4.119457  1.748307  .6350865    7.603827 
Productivity from I activity (Partner)  76  3.762628  0.7150822  2.338111    5.187145  74  5.990917  1.102422  3.793793    8.188041 
Productivity from II activity (Partner)  76                       74  0.1313814  0.1005943  -.0691029    .3318656 
Job Experience (years)  76  10.125  1.042775  8.047686    12.20231  74  8.255405  1.014924  6.232665    10.27815 
Savings/month  76  253.9474  53.4963  147.3773    360.5175  74  375.3604  103.113  169.8565    580.8642 
N. of persons in the house  76  4.394737  0.236998  3.922613    4.866861  74  4.486486  0.1936069  4.100629    4.872344 
N.of children  76  3.421053  0.2479836  2.927044    3.915061  74  3.081081  0.2315033  2.619696    3.542466 
Schooling years (Respondent)  76  8.118421  0.3684806  7.38437    8.852472  74  8.695946  0.2947802  8.10845    9.283442 
Schooling years (Partner)  76  4.75  0.482728  3.788357    5.711643  74  5.824324  0.4619382  4.903683    6.744966 
Credit cycle  76  17.57895  0.5795531  16.42442    18.73348  74  13.89189  0.7411248  12.41483    15.36895 
Total amount of last microcredit received  76  1320.395  76.711  1167.579    1473.211  74  1095.635  68.5187  959.0776    1232.193 





















Table A2. Summary statistics of Socio-Demographic and Economic Variables by Geographic Area (ONLY ELIGIBLE NON-PARTICIPANTS) 
  MITRE  S. BRIGIDA  VILLA DE MAYO 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  [95% Conf. Interval]  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  [95% Conf. Interval]  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  [95% Conf. Interval] 
Respondent’s Age  40  43.60976  2.181093  39.2016    48.01791  61  42.41935  1.695882  39.02823    45.81048  49  45.34694  1.966676  41.39267    49.30121 
Household Income  40  2641.463  304.1126  2026.829    3256.098  61  4692.419  1043.381  2606.05    6778.788  49  3213.98  467.8003  2273.404    4154.555 
Household Food expenditure  40  36.32404  2.802678  30.65962    41.98847  61  51.6129  7.399757  36.81617    66.40963  49  35.5102  2.381054  30.72277    40.29763 
Total Productivity  40  12.86305  1.901459  9.020058    16.70604  61  19.17845  5.055998  9.068362    29.28855  49  13.96254  2.027015  9.886948    18.03812 
Productivity from I activity (Respondent)  40  7.966277  1.211214  5.518323    10.41423  61  13.56442  5.006187  3.553936    23.57491  49  8.252741  1.31733  5.604072    10.90141 
Productivity from II activity (Respondent)  40  2.837527  1.461636  .1165488    5.791604  61  1.608494  0.7383399  .132092    3.084896  49  2.203231  0.988897  .2149207    4.191542 
Productivity from I activity (Partner)  40  2.059247  0.6687287  .7076955    3.410798  61  4.005537  0.8094253  2.386991    5.624082  49  3.506563  0.6550754  2.189446    4.823681 
Productivity from II activity (Partner)  40                  61           49          
Job Experience (years)  40  6.990244  1.212173  4.540351    9.440137  61  7.68871  1.139043  5.411052    9.966368  49  7.52449  1.204567  5.102545    9.946435 
Savings/month  40  68.29268  4.381.767  20.26613    156.8515  61  124.1935  54.06214  16.08961    232.2975  49  29.18367  12.87313  3.300516    55.06683 
N. of persons in the house  40  4.243902  0.3019863  3.633565    4.854239  61  3.822581  0.2471671  3.328339    4.316822  49  3.897959  0.3089439  3.276786    4.519133 
N.of children  40  2.853659  0.3095256  2.228084    3.479233  61  2.419355  0.2428767  1.933693    2.905017  49  2.367347  0.2926159  1.779003    2.955691 
Schooling years (Respondent)  40  8.292683  0.5275853  7.226393    9.358973  61  8.806452  0.3812354  8.044124    9.568779  49  9.163265  0.5300068  8.097615    10.22892 













Table A3. Summary statistics of Socio-Demographic and Economic Variables by Geographic Area (DROP-OUTS) 
  MITRE  S. BRIGIDA 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  [95% Conf. Interval]  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  [95% Conf. Interval] 
Respondent’s Age  77  44.24675  1.350192  41.55761    46.93589  75  40.73333  1.301189  38.14066    43.32601 
Household Income  77  4394.299  297.6539  3801.47    4987.128  75  5523.227  710.3534  4107.817    6938.637 
Household Food expenditure  77  36.56617  2.822026  30.94562    42.18672  75  35.30857  1.933434  31.45612    39.16102 
Total Productivity  77  16.51422  1.340907  13.84357    19.18487  75  24.48296  2.917355  18.67    30.29592 
Productivity from I activity (Respondent)  77  11.05316  0.943819  9.173382    12.93294  75  14.31109  1.643164  11.03702    17.58517 
Productivity from II activity (Respondent)  77  1.747294  0.5126487  .726266    2.768323  75  4.064531  1.725713  .625973    7.503089 
Productivity from I activity (Partner)  77  3.713763  0.707424  2.304806     5.12272  75  5.977705  1.087704  3.810407    8.145002 
Productivity from II activity (Partner)  77           75  0.1296296  0.0992595  -.0681492    .3274085 
Job Experience (years)  77  10.05844  1.031293  8.004443    12.11244  75  8.372  1.008066  6.363385    10.38061 
Savings/month  77  250.6494  52.89987  145.2901    356.0086  75  370.3556  101.8519  167.4112    573.2999 
N. of persons in the house  77  4.441558  0.2385402  3.966465    4.916652  75  4.573333  0.2098248  4.155248    4.991418 
N.of children  77  3.376623  0.2487419  2.881211    3.872036  75  3.093333  0.2287241  2.637591    3.549076 
Schooling years (Respondent)  77  8.012987  0.3786391  7.258862    8.767112  75  8.713333  0.2913425  8.132821    9.293846 
Schooling years (Partner)  77  4.688312  0.4803948  3.731523    5.645101  75  5.786667  0.4572906  4.875495    6.697838 
Credit cycle  77  17.35065  0.6158552  16.12407    18.57723  75  13.70667  0.7542727  12.20375    15.20959 
Total amount of last microcredit received  77  1320.395  76.711  1167.579    1473.211  75  1095.635  68.5187  959.0776    1232.193 
Duration of the microcredit (weeks)  77  10.96053  0.2982056  10.36647    11.55458  75  10.71622  0.2475502  10.22285    11.20958  
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Variable  Description 
Respondent’s Age (Parentage in tab. 5)  Respondents’ Age 
Household Income 
Total monthly family income in pesos (monthly income from all the 
respondent’s activities + monthly income from all the activities of 
respondent’s partner + contributions by other members living in the 
household). 
Household Food expenditure  Daily family food expenditure in pesos 
Total Productivity 
Monthly income from each activities of each family members per hour 
worked (in pesos). 
Productivity from I activity (Respondent) 
Monthly income from the respondent’s main activity  per hour worked 
(in pesos). 
Productivity from II activity (Respondent) 
Monthly income from the respondent’s secondary activity (if any) per 
hour worked (in pesos). 
Productivity from I activity (Partner) 
Monthly income from the partner’s main activity  per hour worked (in 
pesos). 
Productivity from II activity (Partner) 
Monthly income from the partner’s secondary activity  per hour worked 
(in pesos). 
Job Experience (years)  Respondent’s years of experience in the main activity 
Savings/month  Respondent’s monthly savings (in pesos) 
N. of persons in the house  Number of household members 
N.of children (NChildren)  Total number of children in the household 
Schooling years (Respondent) (RespEducation)  Respondent’s years of education  
Schooling years (Partner) (PartnerEducation)  Years of education of the respondent’s partner 
Credit cycle  Cycle of loan received from the MFI (credit seniority)  
Total amount of last microcredit received  Overall amount of the loan received (in pesos) 
Duration of the microcredit (weeks)  Length of the loan (weeks). 
Male  Dummy = 1 if child is male 
Parentage (tab. 4,6,7) 
Respondent’s age cohort dummies: years 29-33; 34-38; 39-43; 44-48; 
>48 (omitted benchmark is 0-29) 
Childage  Child’s age (years) 
PreAfftTend 
Trend variable measuring the number of years before becoming MFI-
borrower 
AffilYears 
Years of uninterrupted lending relationship with the MFI (affiliation 
years) 
Sbrigida  Dummy = 1 if respondent lives in the village of S. Brigida. 
Distant 
Dummy = 1 if child lives above the median distance from the school 
(measured in cuadras: 1 km = 12 cuadras)  
Year-Dummies  Time dummies (1989 is the omitted benchmark) 